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Abstract An alternative to creating novel organisms
through the traditional ‘‘top-down’’ approach to synthetic
biology involves creating them from the ‘‘bottom up’’ by
assembling them from non-living components; the products
of this approach are called ‘‘protocells.’’ In this paper we
describe how bottom-up and top-down synthetic biology
differ, review the current state of protocell research and
development, and examine the unique ethical, social, and
regulatory issues raised by bottom-up synthetic biology.
Protocells have not yet been developed, but many expect
this to happen within the next ﬁve to ten years. Accord-
ingly, we identify six key checkpoints in protocell devel-
opment at which particular attention should be given to
speciﬁc ethical, social and regulatory issues concerning
bottom-up synthetic biology, and make ten recommenda-
tions for responsible protocell science that are tied to the
achievement of these checkpoints.
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Protocells, or bottom-up synthetic biology
Synthetic biology is the attempt to ‘‘engineer complex
artiﬁcial biological systems to investigate natural biological
phenomena and for a variety of applications’’ (Andrianan-
toandro et al. 2006; see also Endy 2005; European Com-
mission 2005; Serrano 2007; Purnick and Weiss 2009).
Most of the best-known work in synthetic biology is ‘‘top
down’’ in the sense that it starts with some pre-existing
natural living system and then re-engineers it for some
desired purpose (e.g., Martin et al. 2003; Ro et al. 2006;
Levskaya et al. 2005), perhaps by synthesizing (Smith et al.
2003; Gibson et al. 2008) or transplanting (Lartigue et al.
2007) entire genomes. Another approach to engineering
novel biological systems works strictly from the ‘‘bottom
up’’ in the sense that it attempts to make new simple kinds
of minimal chemical cellular life, using as raw ingredients
only materials that were never alive.
1 These bottom-up
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1 Unfortunately, the ‘top-down’ vs. ‘bottom-up’ terminology has
been used in many different ways in the synthetic biology literature.
In this paper we follow the terminological conventions of Rasmussen
et al. (2009a), but a variety of alternative conventions exist. A
superﬁcial survey of the synthetic biology literature turned up at least
ﬁve different distinctions that have been marked with the ‘top-down’
vs. ‘bottom-up’ terminology: (1) the distinction between building a
minimal living cell by using extant nucleic acids and enzymes
vs. synthesizing all components from very simple molecules under
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2009a), as we explain below. In the long run, bottom-up and
top-down synthetic biology will increasingly blend and
become harder to distinguish.
2 In the meantime, though, it is
important to separate them, not least because their social
and ethical proﬁles differ. The ethical, social, and regula-
tory challenges raised by top-down synthetic biology have
received considerable attention over the past decade (Cho
et al. 1999; Brent 2006; Maurer et al. 2006; Garﬁnkel et al.
2007; ETC Group 2007; Boldt and Mu ¨ller 2008; Balmer
and Martin 2008; Schmidt et al. 2009). Bottom-up synthetic
biology has only just begun to receive similar scrutiny
(Bedau and Parke 2009b).
In the present paper we outline the social, ethical, and
regulatory issues that speciﬁcally involve bottom-up syn-
thetic biology, or protocells. We identify six key mile-
stones, or ‘‘checkpoints,’’ in protocell science that should
provoke special ethical, social, or regulatory scrutiny, and
propose a series of recommendations for actions that these
checkpoints should trigger. Fully autonomous protocells do
not yet exist, but many expect that the ﬁrst ones could exist
in the laboratory within the next ﬁve to ten years and could
survive in the natural environment outside of the laboratory
within the next ten to twenty years. On that same timescale,
we expect that protocells will also be ready for commercial
applications and that they could become key components in
a new generation of medical, industrial, and informational
technologies. While the vast bulk of protocell work today
is basic research, the driving force in the future will
increasingly be private enterprise.
It is important to stress that the risks entailed by pro-
tocell research today are negligible—no higher than the
everyday risks in typical undergraduate biology and
chemistry laboratories. Yet the perception of risks from
protocells today is not negligible, and protocells have vir-
tually all of the features that tend to make perception of
risk high (Cranor 2009). In addition, responsibly facing
future risks involving protocells requires laying the proper
foundation today. Thus, we think society should now start
to face the unique ethical, social, and regulatory issues
raised by bottom-up synthetic biology.
The chemical nature of protocells
In the protocell research community there is a near-con-
sensus to characterize protocells as chemical systems with
three interlocking chemical capacities or functions. Proto-
cells are deﬁned as self-assembling and self-reproducing
chemical systems created through human artiﬁce (but not
merely by manipulating a natural living organism) that
produce the following interlocking chemical properties: (1)
spatial localization of components by containment (2)
utilization of energy and raw materials from the environ-
ment by metabolism and (3) control of the containment and
metabolism by chemical information that can be replicated
and can mutate (see Box 1). The resulting chemical sys-
tems can reproduce themselves, and a population of them
could adapt and evolve.
3 This characterization of protocells
captures the conception of minimal chemical cellular life
that is generally (if not universally) accepted in the pro-
tocell research community (Rasmussen et al. 2009b). Thus,
just as the engineering word ‘prototype’ refers to an arti-
ﬁcial structure that represents the ﬁrst simple working
model of a designed system, the term ‘protocell’ refers to
the ﬁrst artiﬁcial chemical system that captures the minimal
conditions of cellular forms of life.
When a protocell reproduces, the genetic information
that controls its internal functioning might mutate. If dif-
ferent protocells contain different genetic information, the
resulting behavioral differences could impact their ability
to survive and reproduce. Thus, a population of protocells
could undergo natural (or artiﬁcial) selection and in prin-
ciple, over time, new kinds of protocells could arise in the
evolutionary process. Error-free reproduction can be
achieved in computer science applications; in chemistry,
on the other hand, such reproduction is hardly achieved.
Furthermore, it is undesirable because coping with
changing environmental conditions requires the ability to
adapt and evolve.
A chemical system that cannot autonomously reproduce
itself is not a protocell. For example, what are called
‘‘artiﬁcial red blood cells’’—inert microscopic chemical
systems with the capacity to pick up, carry, and release
oxygen in the blood stream (Shinji 2005; Orive et al.
2003)—do not meet this conception of a protocell. At best
Footnote 1 continued
prebiotic conditions (Luisi 2002) (2) the distinction between in vivo
and in vitro synthetic biology (European Commission 2005) (3) the
distinction between learning about biological systems by traditional
analytical decomposition of natural systems vs. synthetic biological
construction of simpliﬁed artiﬁcial systems (Simpson 2006) (4) the
distinction between constructing a minimal genome by removing
inessential genetic material from natural genomes vs. adding desired
functionality to simple natural organisms by re-engineering their
genomes (Balmer and Martin 2008), and (5) the distinction between
constructing a minimal cell by starting with a whole genome vs.
starting with nucleotides (O’Malley et al. 2008).
2 In addition to the top-down and bottom-up projects, synthetic
biology also contains a research tradition that involves synthesizing
biological systems in vitro (e.g., Kim et al. 2006; Szostak et al. 2001;
Zhang et al. 2007; Lincoln and Joyce 2009).
3 Our use of the term ‘protocell’ follows that of Rasmussen et al.
(2009a). We should note that the term also has somewhat different,
though related, uses. See, e.g., Szostak et al. (2001) or O’Malley et al.
(2008).
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noted that protocells also do not include the ‘‘artiﬁcial
cells’’ produced in top-down synthetic biology (recall dis-
cussion above), all of which involve subjecting existing life
forms to more or less extreme forms of genetic or meta-
bolic reengineering.
Since protocells are deﬁned functionally, rather than
materially, their chemistry might differ dramatically from
that found in existing life forms (Rasmussen et al. 2009a).
This is partly what makes the ethical and social proﬁle of
protocells distinctively different from top-down synthetic
biology.
Comparison with top-down synthetic biology
Many of the ethical, social, and regulatory issues concern-
ing protocells have analogs concerning top-down synthetic
biology, but in some cases the bottom-up and top-down
issues are different. The social risks from top-down syn-
thetic biology prominently include laboratory security, bio-
terrorism (Brent 2006; Maurer et al. 2006; Garﬁnkel et al.
2007) and environmental issues (ETC Group 2007). Current
protocell research typically requires no special laboratory
security or risk management beyond that practiced in any
high school or college biology or chemistry laboratory. This
contrasts with top-down synthetic biology, which currently
can engineer organisms that produce deadly toxins. At the
same time, protocells are put together literally ‘‘from
scratch,’’ rather than just through redesign of existing living
things. Humans have been modifying and redesigning liv-
ing things since the beginning of civilization (e.g., through
crop and animal husbandry); top-down synthetic biology
can be viewed as the most recent form of this long tradition.
Creating the ﬁrst bottom-up protocell, however, will mark
the ﬁrst time humans have synthesized life from wholly
nonliving materials. When we do gain the ability to design
and manipulate protocells to suit deﬁned purposes, this
could have profound impacts on our view of life, including
human life and our picture of our own place in the universe.
If this happens, the social impact of protocells could far
outstrip that of top-down synthetic biology.
One other critical point of comparison between top-
down and bottom-up synthetic biology concerns predict-
ability and possible interaction with the environment.
Much of synthetic biology embraces a vision of working
with ‘‘BioBricks,’’ which are ‘‘standard DNA parts that
encode basic biological functions,’’ and using them to
‘‘program living organisms in the same way that a com-
puter scientist can program a computer’’ (BioBricks
Foundation web site 2009). The aspiration of this vision of
synthetic biology is to make the engineering of living
systems as predictable and reliable as traditional engi-
neering in information technology. By contrast, protocell
research tends to emphasize the biochemical synergies and
other unpredictable emergent properties found in even the
simplest forms of life (Rasmussen et al. 2009b). These
synergies and emergent properties mean that protocell
engineering will hardly be as predictable and reliable as
programming a computer.
4
As synthetic biology progresses beyond semi-static or
one-step processes and incorporates more dynamic control,
it, too, will increasingly need to confront the ethical, social,
and regulatory issues raised by unpredictability. The ability
to chemically program protocells will make it much easier
to design and construct them, and they will have much
greater social and economic value. But the unpredictability
of chemical programmability raises special concerns.
Current programming paradigms and control theory both
require full knowledge of the system of interest, which is
usually assumed to be linear. We do not know today how to
control nonlinear systems governed by unknown parame-
ters, when the systems are as complex as the simplest
natural cells (Rugh 1981/2002).
This makes programming protocells a signiﬁcant chal-
lenge. Protocells are designed to be able to survive and
reproduce in a changing environment. This requires that
they detect and dynamically react to changes in their local
neighborhood (e.g., changing nutrition sources). So, pro-
tocells are dynamic entities through which energy,
resources, information, and waste ﬂow, under the control of
feedback loops. Part of the information that enables
Box 1 Protocells
Created through human artiﬁce but not merely by manipulating a
natural living organism (such as a bacterium), a protocell is a
self-assembling and self-reproducing chemical system, with the
following three properties:
1. It maintains its identity over time by spatially localizing its
components in some form of container.
2. It utilizes free energy from its environment and digests
environmental resources in order to maintain itself, grow,
and ultimately reproduce. This use of energy and materials is a
form of metabolism.
3. The containment and metabolism are under the control of
replicable and inheritable chemical information that can be
‘‘mutated’’ when the protocell reproduces. This informational
chemistry functions as a programmable genetic system.
The proper chemical integration of these three properties enables
protocells to reproduce themselves, and a population of them could
adapt and evolve by natural selection.
4 In protocell programming there is a tradeoff between predictability
on the one hand, and adaptability and resilience on the other.
Commercial applications will aim to strike the right balance between
them.
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genome, perhaps constructed out of a nucleic acid like
DNA, but this genome only partly controls the protocell.
To program and control this sort of holistic dynamical
system, including its embodied physical existence and its
interactions with the environment, involves much more
than controlling the genetic information inside it. The same
holds for the genomes of natural life forms. Contrary to
some of the hype accompanying the human genome pro-
ject, knowing the entire human ‘‘book of life’’ (genome)
has not automatically answered all the important questions
about how to program human life (International Human
Genome Sequencing Consortium 2001; Venter et al. 2001).
Six checkpoints for protocell science and technology
Because protocells do not yet exist, there is no need today
for special measures or institutions to regulate them.
However, it is useful and wise to begin thinking today
about preparing for our future with protocells, and for the
ethical, social, and regulatory issues they will generate (see
Bedau and Parke 2009a, b).
Here we distinguish six key stages in protocell devel-
opment that represent major steps toward their existence
and eventual integration into our technology, and into our
society in general. Of all the scientiﬁc milestones in pro-
tocell science and technology (Rasmussen et al. 2009a),
these six ‘‘checkpoints’’ have special ethical, social, or
regulatory implications:
Checkpoint A: Systematic and advancing research in
protocell synthesis should trigger consideration of the
attendant ethical, social and eventual regulatory impli-
cations. This checkpoint has already been reached, and
discussion has already begun.
Checkpoint B: The technical feasibility of protocells is a
major social and ethical checkpoint concerning proto-
cells because it signals that all the main scientiﬁc hurdles
to making autonomous protocells have been surmounted.
This is the most critical checkpoint that precedes the
actual existence of protocells.
Checkpoint C: Creating the ﬁrst fully autonomous proto-
cell in the laboratory would involve creating a self-
assembling and self-reproducing chemical system with
the properties of containment, metabolism, and program-
mability. This is the single scientiﬁc protocell achieve-
ment with the greatest social and ethical signiﬁcance.
Checkpoint D: Protocells that could survive outside the
laboratory have the potential to cause harm to human
health and the environment, so the ability to survive in
the environment should trigger a re-assessment of
regulation and containment standards for protocells.
Checkpoint E: Actually releasing protocells outside the
laboratory (possibly for commercial reasons) would
have special social signiﬁcance because protocells
would be in direct contact with vastly many more forms
of life, including people.
Checkpoint F: Protocells that are toxic or infectious
would trigger the need for appropriate safety regulations.
Toxic or infectious protocells that existed only in the
laboratory (Checkpoint C) would already be a risk. That
risk would dramatically multiply if protocells were used
outside the laboratory (Checkpoint E) in medical or
environmental applications, because their usefulness
would hinge on their exponential proliferation.
There are a number of dependencies among the six
checkpoints. Some checkpoints can arise only after others
have already been met. For example, the technical feasi-
bility of protocells (Checkpoint B) must precede the actual
creation of the ﬁrst protocells (Checkpoint C), and the ﬁrst
creation of protocells (Checkpoint C) must precede their
release in the environment (Checkpoint E). For a different
kind of reason, actual release outside the laboratory
(Checkpoint E) is a signiﬁcant checkpoint only if protocells
could survive outside the lab (Checkpoint D).
Note that the dependencies among the checkpoints do
not follow strict alphabetic order. In particular, protocells
could be toxic or infectious (Checkpoint F) before they
could survive outside the lab (Checkpoint D) or are actu-
ally released in the environment (Checkpoint E), so
Checkpoint F might arise before Checkpoints D and E.
The justiﬁcations for the checkpoints are varied. The
mere existence today of systematic and advancing research
on protocells (Checkpoint A) itself raises a number of
ethical, social, and regulatory issues, although existing
ethical, social, and regulatory practices and institutions
might be adequate to address those issues. This will
change, though, when protocells are within scientiﬁc reach
and Checkpoint B is reached. Today the main remaining
technical hurdle that is blocking the creation of protocells
is closing the replication loop, that is, making a protocell
that can autonomously reproduce itself along with all its
functional components. This, in turn, requires reading
internally-stored descriptions of the protocell’s functional
components and ‘‘translating’’ those descriptions into
functional entities. All other chemical requirements for
protocells either are already available or are relatively easy
to foresee.
The technical feasibility of protocells (Checkpoint B) is
an important checkpoint only because it opens the door to
fully autonomous protocells (Checkpoint C). Checkpoint C
has a pivotal position among our checkpoints: All previous
checkpoints derive their importance only because they lead
to the creation of protocells, and all subsequent
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ally exist.
The ﬁrst protocells will almost certainly be highly
dependent on a very speciﬁc and carefully created labora-
tory environment. A further scientiﬁc achievement would
be to enable them to survive outside of the laboratory
(Checkpoint D). This is an important commercial goal.
Once it is possible for protocells to survive in the external
environment, a qualitatively different kind of risk arises
and a series of new ecological questions become pressing:
How quickly do protocells degrade in different environ-
ments? Do they degrade into something harmful? What
side effects or collateral damage should be expected?
The actual release of protocells into the environment
outside of the laboratory is Checkpoint E. The scale of
protocell commercial application could mushroom and
their numbers could skyrocket only after they exist outside
the lab. When protocells leave the laboratory, they will
either be intentionally released into the environment (ini-
tially in a highly targeted manner), or they will be conﬁned
in industrial facilities. At this juncture, environmental
impact lessons concerning nanotechnology and top-down
synthetic biology become applicable to protocells. Indus-
trial use of protocells avoids certain social and regulatory
concerns because the protocells are conﬁned to industrial
facilities and could be carefully monitored and controlled.
The precursors of autonomous protocells (which would
exist before Checkpoint C) could be toxic or infectious, but
the risks involved would greatly increase when the dan-
gerous agents could reproduce exponentially, as fully
autonomous protocells would. As noted above, toxic or
infectious protocells (Checkpoint F) could exist before
protocells could survive outside the lab (Checkpoint D) or
are actually released in the environment (Checkpoint E).
Toxic or infectious protocells would immediately become
subject to existing tests and regulations for toxicity and
infectiousness, but some of protocells’ distinctive proper-
ties, such as their ability to adapt and evolve, might call for
special measures. The severe new potential hazards pre-
sented by developments in nanotechnology and top-down
synthetic biology hint at the challenges that will be raised
by the existence of bottom-up protocells. There is consid-
erable uncertainty about the exact scope and nature of those
risks.
Recommendations about protocells
In this section we outline a series of recommendations for
socially responsible and ethical protocell research and
development. Each of the checkpoints described above
raises a speciﬁc set of issues, so our recommendations are
connected to the speciﬁc checkpoints that trigger them.
Advances in protocell research are already gaining
public attention, and this attention will increase as work on
protocells moves from the research to the development
stage. Thoughtful communication with the public should be
one of the earliest concerns on the agenda for socially and
ethically responsible protocell research. As the technical
feasibility of creating protocells (Checkpoint B) approa-
ches, communications with the public should address the
social and cultural concerns that arise regarding protocells
(discussed below). It is also important in these early stages
to avoid as much as possible the kind of media hype
associated with, e.g., early cloning research and synthetic
biology projects, and to stress to the public that the actual
risk of protocell research today is negligible. The public
will be more likely to accept this if they are supplied with
clear information about the actual state of the science,
rather than hype about prospects for protocells many years
in the future. This leads to our ﬁrst recommendation:
Recommendation 1 Success at reaching any major sci-
entiﬁc milestone in protocell research, or any of the
checkpoints identiﬁed above, should be clearly and
promptly communicated to the public.
As seen already in top-down synthetic biology, the
prospect of the ability to design and engineer entirely new
life forms generates tension with a number of deep social,
cultural, and religious norms and preconceptions (Cho
et al. 1999). This prompts the recommendation that
responsible stakeholders in protocell research should
engage the public in discussing these concerns as early in
the process of developing protocells as possible.
Recommendation 2 Reaching any of the checkpoints
should be accompanied by open public discussion of social,
cultural, religious, or other concerns and worries about
protocells.
Social, cultural, and religious concerns may include (but
are not limited to) the following kinds of issues:
• Conﬂict with religious doctrines. Many of the new
technologies for manipulating life forms, such as in
vitro fertilization, reproductive cloning, and embryonic
stem cell research, seem to conﬂict with the doctrines
of various religions (Kass 2002; Pullella 2008). These
biotechnologies become controversial mainly when
they are applied to human life, so protocell technology
might escape similar condemnation for the foreseeable
future. But since any new and powerful technology
could indirectly impact human life, making protocells
even in a research context might violate someone’s
deeply held religious doctrines.
• Violating nature. The ‘‘unnaturalness’’ of bottom-up
protocells unsettles some people, because they feel that
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wisdom of life, or upsets the balance of nature (e.g.,
Fukuyama 2002). Admittedly, protocells might be quite
unlike any currently existing form of life. However, the
boundary between the natural and the artiﬁcial is
difﬁcult to draw, and protocells themselves have the
potential to shift the boundaries of what would be
considered natural. The ethical implications of these
boundaries are controversial.
• Playing God. The worry here is not that only God could
create wholly new forms of life, but that only a being
with almost God-like understanding and wisdom would
have the moral and scientiﬁc insight required to
properly and judiciously exercise the capacity to create
new forms of life (Bedau and Parke 2009a). Note that
this concern does not depend on belief in any particular
religious doctrine.
The ethical and cultural concerns that arise with respect
to modifying life or creating new life carry a special weight
when applied to bottom-up protocells. In particular, the
concerns about violating nature and ‘‘playing God’’ men-
tioned above apply more signiﬁcantly in the case of bot-
tom-up protocells than they do in the case of top-down
synthetic biology. Where to draw the line between the
natural and the artiﬁcial is a complex matter, but the fact
that protocells are made from nonliving materials intui-
tively makes them seem less natural (and thus, more
objectionable, on this line of reasoning) than top-down
synthetic biology organisms created by re-assembling
preexisting biological parts. Similarly, if the playing God
objection depends on how unnatural the new forms of life
are, assembling life from the bottom up would seem to be
more objectionable than re-engineering existing life.
Funding agencies signiﬁcantly shape the course and
conduct of research activities, and they can be an important
force for change. Initiatives for funding protocell science
should follow the lead of the Human Genome Project and
set aside a ﬁxed percentage of their funds for studies of the
social, ethical, and legal implications of protocell devel-
opment, and for public education on scientiﬁc advances in
protocell science (Gaisser et al. 2008).
Recommendation 3 In order to carefully examine the
social and ethical implications of protocells, once system-
atic and sustained protocell research is happening
(Checkpoint A), funding for protocell research should set
aside a small fraction (initially, 5%) of total funds for the
study of the ethical, legal, and social implications of pro-
tocell research and development.
In addition to the public education efforts mentioned
above, an academic curriculum covering social and cultural
aspects of protocell research will contribute to creating
generations of responsible scientists in the ﬁeld. A general
culture of thoughtful and responsible action should be
cultivated in the protocell research community. Forming a
professional society (none exists so far) for bottom-up
protocells will be a key step toward promoting such a
culture.
Recommendation 4 Once systematic and sustained pro-
tocell research is happening (Checkpoint A), education in
the beneﬁts, risks, uncertainties, and best practices of
protocell research should become a regular part of the
synthetic biology research curriculum at colleges and
universities.
Recently, there have been controversies in intellectual
property law concerning new informational and biological
technologies, such as whether and how algorithms and
software should be patented, and whether patents should be
granted for genetic material ranging from individual genes
to whole genomes. This suggests that the special features of
protocells will themselves undoubtedly raise new intellec-
tual property challenges (Pottage 2009). One concern arises
from the fact that protocells are part of a brand new, still-
emerging technology. Because protocells are so new,
existing intellectual property claims cover very little of the
ﬁeld and thus leave the ﬁeld wide open for new claims.
Some commentators are concerned that this will give ﬁrst
movers an opportunity to own and control extremely broad
swaths of intellectual property; an example from top-down
synthetic biology is expressed in the ETC Group’s con-
cerns (2007) about J. C. Venter’s application to patent his
modiﬁed forms of Mycoplasma genitalium (USPTO 2007).
Recommendation 5 By the time protocells are within
technical reach (Checkpoint B), and at each subsequent
checkpoint, intellectual property regulations should be re-
evaluated with regard to whether they adequately deal with
the distinctive properties of protocells.
We expect unique issues to arise for bottom-up proto-
cells in the area of intellectual property. The wide-open
nature of the new ﬁeld of bottom-up protocell technol-
ogy—which makes it vulnerable to overly broad patents
aimed at monopolies—will have serious legal implications.
Furthermore, we expect strong (and possibly novel) ethical
controversies will arise when it comes time to issue patents
for bottom-up protocells. The social issues surrounding the
patenting of life forms have been evident at least since the
1980 US Supreme Court case Diamond v. Chakrabarty
(447 U.S. 303), which afﬁrmed that genetically modiﬁed
micro-organisms could be patented. One focal point of this
debate is the legal issue of whether a genetically modiﬁed
life form can really be called an ‘‘invention,’’ since it is just
a modiﬁcation of a pre-existing biological entity that
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created from nonliving material, however, will be unam-
biguously man-made; this will add a whole new dimension
to the ethical debates around any claims of life forms as
intellectual property.
The synthetic biology community has devoted attention
to the threat that synthetic biology might be used by ter-
rorists or other malevolent parties to create new biowea-
pons. It is conceivable that protocells could similarly be
used as bioweapons, or as vehicles for espionage, or as tags
for surreptitiously tracking people. This potential for dual
use of protocells (that is, development for both peaceful
and harmful aims) must be admitted, but it should not be
overestimated or exaggerated. Protocells would be a poor
choice for anyone intending to cause harm to people, for
they would be difﬁcult to control and target with preci-
sion.
5 There are much easier ways to wreak havoc than
using protocells.
Recommendation 6 Before protocells are technically
feasible (Checkpoint B), the relatively low likelihood of
malicious use of protocells should be clearly explained in
communications concerning the risks of protocells. The
potential for malicious use should be re-evaluated at each
checkpoint once protocells become technically feasible
(Checkpoint B).
As suggested earlier, it may be that existing oversight
institutions provide some or even all of the oversight
presently needed for protocells, given that they do not yet
exist and are not yet within technical reach. Nevertheless,
we should still review whether existing institutions provide
adequate regulation for future protocell research and
development, or whether the existence of protocells will
reveal gaps in the current regulatory structures. This review
process should begin now and should be completed before
Checkpoint B (technical feasibility). As a part of this
review, all existing institutions under whose oversight and
regulation protocell development might fall should be
equipped with the relevant knowledge to apply their
mandates to this new technology. Oversight institutions
should distinguish four different bodies that are subject to
recommendations or regulations: (i) the scientiﬁc commu-
nity engaged in protocell research (ii) the governmental
agencies responsible for regulating protocell research and
development (iii) companies that produce protocells com-
mercially and (iv) consumer protection bodies.
Recommendation 7 Once the feasibility of autonomous
protocells (Checkpoint B) is visible on the horizon, the
special regulation issues raised by protocells must be
reviewed. Proper oversight institutions for protocells
should be established well before fully autonomous pro-
tocells exist (Checkpoint C), and these institutions should
be re-evaluated at each subsequent checkpoint.
A standardized system of classifying levels of precau-
tion when handling biological agents exists, which uses a
scheme of four biosafety levels. We recommend that some
analogous classiﬁcation system be developed for working
with protocells in the laboratory. Certain features of pro-
tocells will merit special attention when implementing such
a system. Some features can be predicted now, and some
will be recognized only after protocells are capable of
surviving outside the laboratory, and the creation of toxic
or infectious protocells is a possibility (i.e., when Check-
points D and F are reached). Features such as autonomous
reproduction, adaptation, and evolution are novel and will
be particular to protocells; we cannot assume that tradi-
tional biosafety levels developed without special attention
to these powerful novelties will be adequate for their
containment and regulation. Upon creation of the ﬁrst fully
autonomous protocell (Checkpoint C) and at every check-
point thereafter, protocell safety classiﬁcation should be re-
examined and revised. This is because, by the time those
checkpoints are reached, scientists will understand many
more of the details connected with the actual safety issues
and underlying mechanisms of protocells; these unknown
details are the proper basis for resolving the details of this
classiﬁcation system.
Recommendation 8 Before autonomous protocells have
been created (Checkpoint B), existing oversight institutions
should develop both a classiﬁcation of protocell safety
levels and a list of best practices and protocols for safely
using protocells in the laboratory.
Protocells will be able to metabolize material from their
environments, reproduce, and evolve. Because they will be
able to evolve, there is some chance that they could cause
problems for human health or the environment. Therefore,
as protocell research progresses, appropriate safety mech-
anisms should be implemented in anticipation of any such
points where control could be lost (e.g., when protocells
could potentially survive outside the laboratory, Check-
point D). Society has had signiﬁcant experience providing
oversight and regulation with certain kinds of complex and
potentially dangerous systems. For example, so-called
‘‘dependable’’ systems in computer science and engineer-
ing have resilient, built-in safeguards to prevent erroneous
or dangerous behavior. Making protocells similarly
‘‘dependable’’ is a key goal.
5 It is telling that the most recent unclassiﬁed reference on
unconventional warfare (Department of the Army 2008) devotes
only one sentence in 248 pages to the possible danger of biological
warfare. In principle, this area is already regulated by the Biological
Weapons Convention.
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(Checkpoint A) and before their technical feasibility is
secured (Checkpoint B), a comprehensive plan for safety
mechanisms should be developed.
Recommendation 9b Before protocells have been created
(Checkpoint C), a comprehensive and thoroughly vetted set
of safety mechanisms should be identiﬁed.
Recommendation 9c Before protocells could survive
outside the laboratory (Checkpoint D), the vetted set of
safety mechanisms should be implemented and thoroughly
tested.
Recommendation 9d Before protocells are released out-
side the laboratory (Checkpoint E), thoroughly tested
safety mechanisms and quality assurance measures should
be deployed, and their success should be re-evaluated at
subsequent checkpoints, so that the safety mechanisms can
be adjusted and improved as necessary.
Recommendation 9e Before toxic or infectious protocells
exist (Checkpoint F), a proper framework of regulations
and procedures both for handling toxic and infectious
agents and for providing the proper oversight of protocells
must be implemented.
Once again, we hasten to point out that toxic or infec-
tious protocells might exist (Checkpoint F) well before
protocells could survive outside the laboratory (Checkpoint
D) or are actually released in the environment (Checkpoint
E). So, Recommendation 9e might be triggered before
Recommendations 9c or 9d.
Recommendations 8 and 9 involve responsible regula-
tion and risk management concerning protocells. Future
developments in protocell technology will probably prompt
the need for further actions on regulation and risk man-
agement beyond those listed here. Society must constantly
reassess the responsible development of protocell tech-
nology once their autonomous existence becomes techni-
cally possible (Checkpoint B).
Until we approach actual release of protocells outside
the laboratory (Checkpoint E), we will lack enough infor-
mation to accurately evaluate the environmental impact of
protocells. Protocells will be unlike existing life forms and
they might impact the environment very differently, in
ways that we will better understand only after we start to
make the transition from research to development. We
should start now to investigate the environmental impact of
protocells in an anticipatory way, always remembering our
current lack of full information and always accepting the
responsibility to continue to re-evaluate the situation until
protocells are actually released in the environment
(Checkpoint E), and beyond. One issue that needs contin-
ual re-evaluation is the biocompatibility of protocells.
Protocells might directly interact with other organisms in
the environment. In addition, the environmental impact of
protocells might result from their impact on the abiotic
environment (e.g., by increasing or decreasing greenhouse
gases), which would indirectly affect forms of life that
depend on that environment.
Recommendation 10 Oversight institutions should be
mindful now of the potential future environmental impact
of protocells. The possible and expected environmental
impact of protocells should be openly discussed and
investigated as soon as protocells become technically fea-
sible (Checkpoint B), and oversight institutions should take
concrete steps to evaluate and consider environmental
impact as an explicit issue well before protocells could
survive outside the laboratory (Checkpoint D).
Our recommendations about protocell risks and regu-
lation are speciﬁcally tied to the unique features of
bottom-up synthetic biology. Recommendation 8 about
oversight institutions is contingent on the technical fea-
sibility of protocells (Checkpoint B), but Checkpoint B is
pending only for bottom-up, not top-down, synthetic
biology. Recommendation 9 about safety mechanisms has
a forward-looking ﬁve-part structure that mirrors
Checkpoints B–F. These checkpoints are relevant only
for bottom-up synthetic biology. It should be noted that
the environmental impact of protocells (Recommendation
10) might be signiﬁcantly less than that of top-down
synthetic biology today, or at least signiﬁcantly different,
if protocells are made out of ‘‘unnatural’’ materials that
interact minimally with their environment (i.e., materials
that are different enough from those that make up current
living organisms in some of the key ways described
earlier in this paper).
The way in which each of the six checkpoints triggers
speciﬁc recommendations is summarized in Table 1.S o m e
recommendations concern checkpoints that trigger a dis-
crete action (indicated with single check marks), such as
communicating the latest scientiﬁc progress to the public
(Recommendation 1) or re-evaluating regulations about
intellectual property rights (Recommendation 5). Other
recommendations involve creating ongoing processes
(indicated with double check marks), such as creating and
teaching a curriculum on the social and ethical issues
concerning protocells (Recommendation 4) or implement-
ing environmental controls (Recommendation 10). In
general ongoing processes would continue through all
subsequent checkpoints. Many recommendations ﬁrst need
to have the ground prepared (indicated with a check mark
in parentheses); this holds, for example, for deploying
safety mechanisms (Recommendation 9d) and creating
environmental controls (Recommendation 10).
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Protocell science and technology (Rasmussen et al. 2009a)
is a bottom-up form of synthetic biology that is synthe-
sizing novel kinds of living systems from materials that
have never been alive. So, part of society’s evaluation of
synthetic biology in general must focus on the ethical,
social, and regulatory issues that speciﬁcally involve pro-
tocell science and technology, or bottom-up synthetic
biology. Many of the broader issues involving protocells
have parallels in top-down synthetic biology; for example,
the trajectory of development in both areas will be
increasingly driven by potential commercial applications.
But some broader issues are unique to protocells.
We have identiﬁed six checkpoints in protocell science
and technology that call for signiﬁcant ethical, social, and
regulatory attention. These checkpoints are speciﬁcally
relevant only for bottom-up synthetic biology. We have
also proposed ten speciﬁc recommendations about the
ethical, social, and regulatory aspects of protocells. The
way in which speciﬁc checkpoints trigger speciﬁc recom-
mendations is summarized in Table 1.
One of the lessons of this paper is that the details of the
social and ethical implications of protocells often largely
hinge on speciﬁc information that will not be available
until science and technology have progressed further. So,
the details of our analysis should be treated as a work in
progress and continually revisited as we learn more about
protocells. Nevertheless, some broad lessons can be
gleaned from the overall structure of Table 1.
Table 1 vividly shows that a number of the social and
ethical implications of protocells require attention right
now. Although fully autonomous protocells are not yet
technically feasible, the time is already ripe to communi-
cate the state of protocell science to the general public
(Recommendation 1), to address cultural and religious
concerns about assembling new forms of life in the labo-
ratory (Recommendation 2), to fund further investigation
of the ethical, legal, and social implications of protocells
(Recommendation 3), and to start creating a curriculum
covering these issues (Recommendation 4). In addition, we
should also start laying the foundation for subsequently
evaluating IP regulations, potential misuse, safety mecha-
nisms, and regulatory scope. We should stress that these
recommendations are what we believe should happen, but
in general they are not yet happening. So, we are sounding
a call to action.
Table 1 also vividly conveys how the social and ethical
implications of bottom-up and top-down synthetic biology
differ. The six checkpoints for protocell research and
development have no particular signiﬁcance in top-down
synthetic biology. The social and ethical implications of
bottom-up synthetic biology unfold over time in
connection with speciﬁc scientiﬁc and technical achieve-
ments in a distinctive way, summarized in Table 1.T h i s
directly results from the fact that protocells are produced in
a bottom-up fashion, rather than starting with existing
forms of life and then modifying them.
What animates most of the social and ethical issues
concerning protocells is that protocells are for all intents
and purposes autonomous forms of life. This is what raises
many of the social and religious concerns; this is what
makes safety mechanisms so vital; this is what drives the
need for thinking through their environmental conse-
quences; and this is what makes the ultimate impact of
protocells so hard to predict.
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